CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL)

SYSTEM: SUBSYSTEM: ASI

FUNCTIONAL CRIT:

REV & DATE:

DCN & DATE:

Electrical Cable Trays J, 12-19-97

PHASE(S): HAZARD REF:

S.11

ANALYSTS:

J. Hicks/E. Howell

FAILURE MODE:

Structural Failure

FAILURE EFFECT:

Loss of mission and vehicle/crew due to ET structural failure or debris source to Orbiter from support components.

TIME TO EFFECT:

Immediate

FAILURE CAUSE(S):

Improper Manufacture

В: Failure of Attaching Mardware

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

Not Applicable

FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION: Support hardware for trays mounted to RH and LH vertical struts.

FMEA ITEM	PART NO.	PART NAME	QTY	EFFECTIVITY
4.3.62.1	80911071810-019	Support Assembly	1	LWT-54 & Up
4.3.63.1	80911071810-014	Strap	4	լաт-54 & Աթ
4.3.64.1	80911071810-008	Support	1	LWT-54 & Up
4.3.65.1	80911071810-005	Support	1	LUT-54 & Up
4.3.66.1	80911071810-015	Strap	4	LWT-54 & Up
4.3.67.1	80911071810-011	Support	1	LWT-54 & Up

The cable tray support components are grouped as the failure mode, causes and effects are the same. REMARKS:

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) CONTINUATION SHEET

SYSTEM:

ASI

REV & DATE:

SUBSYSTEM: FMEA ITEM CODE(S): Electrical Cable Trays

DCN & DATE:

J, 12-19-97

4.3.62.1, 4.3.63.1, 4.3.64.1, 4.3.65.1, 4.3.66.1, 4.3.67.1

RATIONALE FOR RETENTION

DESIGN:

The support components are machined from 2219-T87 aluminum sheet and plate stock. Materials selected for A. B: this part number are in accordance with MMC-ET-SE16 which assures repetitive conformance of composition and properties. Surface integrity is assured by penetrant inspection per STP2501.

The support components are designed to the required yield (1.1) and ultimate (1.4) safety factors (ET Stress Report 826-2188). A:

The attaching hardware is selected from the Approved Standard Parts List (ASPL 826-3500). The hardware R: is installed per STP2014 and torqued using values specified on Engineering drawings. installation loads are sufficient to provide screening for major flaws in individual fasteners.

TEST:

The Support Assembly, Straps and Supports are certified. Reference HCS MMC-ET-TMO8-L-S043 (LWT-54 thru 88) and HCS MMC-ET-TM08-L-S516 (LWT-89 & Up).

<u>Vendor:</u>

Attaching fasteners are procured and tested to standard drawings NAS1221, 26L2, 26L3 and 33L1. В:

INSPECTION:

Vendor Inspection-Lockheed Martin Surveillance:

Verify materials selection and verification controls (MMC-ET-SE16, drawing 80911071810 and standard drawings NAS1221, 26L2, 26L3 and 33L1). A, B:

Penetrant inspect part (drawing 80911071810 and STP2501 Type 1, Method A). A:

Inspect dimensional conformance (drawing 80911071810). Δ.

MAF Quality Inspection:

Inspect that attaching hardware is free from damage (drawing 80911071809 and STP2014). 8:

Verify installation and witness torque (drawing 80911071809 and STP2014). A, B:

FAILURE HISTORY:

Current data on test failures, unexplained anomalies and other failures experienced during ground processing activity can be found in the PRACA data base.